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9 Tying: a transatlantic perspective
David W. Hull1
Introduction
At a time when the European Commission is rethinking its policy on the
abuse of dominant position under Article 82, the law on tying is particu-
larly ripe for reform. In the antitrust field, tying stands out as an area where
there is a stark divergence between what the law is as set out in the case law
and the general consensus in the antitrust community on what the law
should be. In both the United States and the European Union, tying is gen-
erally analyzed under some form of a per se rule, while the consensus in the
antitrust community is that it should be analyzed under the rule of reason,
which allows for a more robust economic analysis that considers eﬀects on
the market and possible eﬃciencies.
In recent years, the need to bring the law on tying into line with con-
temporary economic thinking has generated extensive commentary
among antitrust lawyers and economists. The explanation for this may be
that tying is at the heart of both the US and EU versions of the recent
Microsoft case. While any key issue in such a prominent case is likely to
attract extensive comments from the antitrust community, this is particu-
larly true with tying in this case.2 First, the tying involved in Microsoft is
the kind of tying that is generally recognized as generating various
eﬃciencies, thus underscoring the shortcomings of a per se approach.
Second, Microsoft highlights the need to find a workable approach to
tying because tying is of central importance in an economy that is
characterized by increasing product integration and convergence, partic-
ularly in high-tech sectors such as information technology and consumer
electronics.
As discussed below, the decisions on both sides of the Atlantic in the
Microsoft case suggest that the law in both the United States and the
European Union is moving towards a rule-of-reason approach. The law
remains in an unsatisfactory state, however, both because it is unclear to
what extent this more flexible approach has broader application beyond the
facts of Microsoft, and because the features of the optimal test remain
unclear. Consequently the Commission’s review of its approach to abuse of
dominance under Article 82 with a view to issuing guidelines is a welcome
exercise as guidelines could help answer these questions and bring the law
more into line with current economic thinking.
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This chapter has two goals. First, it summarizes how tying is treated
under current economic theory and the state of the law on tying in the
United States and the European Union. A comparison of the approaches
to tying on both sides of the Atlantic should provide greater insights into
the issues, and tying would seem to lend itself to a transatlantic compari-
son as both jurisdictions recently have had to deal with a similar set of facts
in Microsoft. Second, with this background, it makes some recommend-
ations as to the general contours of an optimal approach to tying and sug-
gests some areas that might merit further inquiry as the Commission moves
forward with its Article 82 review.
The economics of tying
While economics has long been a mainstay of US antitrust analysis, it has
only recently come to the fore in Europe. In the past few years, the EU com-
petition rules governing restrictive agreements covered by Article 81 (e.g.
vertical agreements, intellectual property licences, horizontal agreements)
and mergers falling within the scope of the EU Merger Regulation have
undergone major reforms in an eﬀort to inject greater economic analysis.
Article 82 seems to be on the brink of a similar sea change with the
European Commission’s commencement of a review of its policy under
Article 82. In December 2005, the Commission issued a Discussion Paper
that clearly favors an economics-based approach as opposed to a legalistic,
form-based approach.3 As part of this project, the Commission commis-
sioned a study by a group of prominent European economists, which was
released in July 2005, and which, not surprisingly, argues in favour of an
eﬀects-based approach to Article 82.4
Although a thorough discussion of the economics of tying is beyond the
scope of this chapter, it is useful to review briefly the evolution of economic
thinking on tying, and particularly the harms and benefits of tying that have
been identified by economists.5 Initially, economists were hostile to tying,
viewing it as nothing more than a means for a dominant firm to extend its
market power in the tying market to the tied market. Chicago School econ-
omists challenged this traditional view, arguing that tying was rarely
harmful. They reasoned that a dominant firm generally could not use its
dominant position in the market for the tying product to extract monopoly
profits on the market for the tied product because it only had one monop-
oly and, if it tried to extend its monopoly, could wind up undermining it.
Chicago School economists also pointed out that tying could achieve a
number of eﬃciencies, some of which are listed below. More recently, post-
Chicago School economists have challenged this view, arguing that there are
circumstances in which the Chicago School’s theory does not hold true,
particularly when the tied market is not perfectly competitive.
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While the debate on the optimal approach to tying is not yet over, there
seems to be general agreement on the main benefits and harms associated
with tying. The two main anticompetitive eﬀects that have been identified
are as follows:
● Monopolizing the tied good’s market: a principle anticompetitive eﬀect
is leveraging the firm’s dominance in the tying product’s market to
increase profits and foreclose competition in the tied product’s market.
● Protecting the monopoly in the tying good’s market: another anticom-
petitive eﬀect frequently identified by economists is preservation of
the ﬁrm’s dominant position in the tying market. In this case, the
dominant firm is concerned that a competitor will first establish its
position on the tied product’s market and later enter the tying
product’s market.
The main eﬃciencies generally associated with tying are as follows:
● Lower production costs: tying may lead to lower production costs by
allowing manufacturers to achieve economies of scale.
● Lower transaction costs: tying reduces the transaction costs of buying
the two products separately. For example, it is easier for consumers
to buy software applications that are bundled rather than shopping
for each separately.
● Lower distribution costs: tying may lead to a reduction in distribution
costs in that it may be cheaper to package, ship and invoice products
as one unit than separately.
● Quality improvement: tying may lead to an improvement in the
quality of the product. For example, the success of PC manufactur-
ers in selling a bundled product that consists of the PC, the screen,
the keyboard, the mouse and other peripherals is at least partly
attributable to the perception that there will be fewer glitches with
hardware components designed to work together as opposed to the
situation where each component is purchased separately. Such
quality considerations are particularly relevant in high-tech products
where technological integration is important.
● Pricing: tying may result in more competitive pricing for the bundled
product than could be achieved if each product were sold separately.
In cases where tying is used as a metering device (e.g. photocopiers
and paper), it enables the seller to measure the demand for the
product and tailor its pricing strategy accordingly. Economists have
shown that this ability to discriminate among customers can be
beneficial for some of them.
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Since economists continue to debate various aspects of tying such as the
precise harms and benefits associated with it, how often they arise, and how
they can be measured, it may be going too far to say that they agree that
tying is generally beneficial and only rarely harmful.6 It would seem safe to
say, however, that a broad consensus has emerged on at least one point:
tying is not generally anticompetitive because, more often than not, it gives
rise to eﬃciencies. Even a consensus on this limited point is useful in
fashioning the best approach to tying. As discussed below, if tying is not
generally anticompetitive, a per se rule – even a watered-down per se rule –
would not appear to be the best approach to evaluating tying practices.
The legal tests
Overview
This section reviews the legal tests for tying that have been developed in the
United States and the European Union. The two jurisdictions are similar
in that the prevailing test in each is a per se test, but the recent decisions on
each side of the Atlantic in Microsoft suggest that each jurisdiction may be
moving towards a rule-of-reason test. However drawing parallels between
the jurisdictions based on labels assigned to the tests can be misleading. The
US courts have developed a per se test that sometimes works more like a
rule-of-reason test because it allows the consideration of factors that typ-
ically would only be taken into consideration under a rule-of-reason test.
For its part, the European Commission has developed what it labels a rule-
of-reason test, but which operates more like a version of the per se test
because it places such a heavy burden of proof on the defendant.
US law
(a) A peculiar per se test Initially, US courts were hostile to tying and
applied a strict per se test under which it was suﬃcient to show that a tying
arrangement existed and that it aﬀected a ‘not insubstantial’ volume of
trade. This early hostility to tying is evident in this widely-quoted passage
from the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Northern Pacific Railway:
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in
and of themselves are . . . tying arrangements. . . . Indeed, ‘tying arrangements
serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.’ . . . They are
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has suﬃcient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of interstate
commerce is aﬀected.7
While this quotation suggests that it was necessary to show market power
over the tying product, in practice, this was often inferred from the
existence of a tie.8
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This approach to tying analysis was condemned by Chicago School
economists. Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, which is known for its
scathing criticism of many antitrust principles that were widely accepted at
the time of its publication in 1978, reserved particularly stinging remarks
for the strict per se approach to tying:
A review of the cases reveals the sterile circularity of the law’s reasoning, the
untenability of its premises, and the error of its most assured pronouncements.
These matters have been repeatedly and conclusively demonstrated by a number
of commentators, yet the law remains majestically impervious to any critical
analysis.9
Over time, US courts have moved away from the strict per se test that was
the object of Bork’s criticism, watering it down to the point that it is now
described as a ‘highly idiosyncratic’10 or ‘modified’ per se rule. Under a pure
per se rule, once conduct is shown to occur, it is condemned without regard
to proof of market power, eﬀect, intention or possible justifications. For
example, a naked price-fixing cartel is deemed to be anticompetitive in vir-
tually all situations. The current per se test applied to tying does not operate
like a pure per se test because it is subject to various qualifications that are
not usually associated with a per se test. Perhaps the simplest explanation
for the departure from a strict per se rule is that courts recognized that tying
is ubiquitous and often benign. Consequently a more flexible rule was
needed, and courts showed considerable creativity in achieving this flexi-
bility while remaining, at least nominally, within the confines of a per se
rule. For example, some courts found that the alleged tying and tied prod-
ucts constituted a single product and, thus, the arrangement was not a tie
at all. Others required evidence of power in the tying product’s market
rather than simply inferring this from the existence of the tie. Still others
allowed ‘business justifications’ to be pleaded as defences.
Perhaps the most prominent example of the movement away from a strict
per se rule is the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Jeﬀerson Parish.11 In that
case, the tying involved requiring a hospital’s patients to use the anaesthe-
siological services of a provider with which the hospital had an exclusive
arrangement. The Court moved away from a strict per se test in two
respects. First, in determining whether the two-products test was met, it
focused on whether there was a separate demand for the tied product rather
than on the functional relationship between the two products, which had
been the approach in earlier cases. Second, the Court emphasized that the
economic power required over the tying product was market power and not
some vague notion of economic power. This insistence on proof of market
power over the tying product meant that market power could no longer be
inferred simply from the existence of a tie. Applying these criteria, the
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Court concluded that it was inappropriate to apply the per se rule because
Jeﬀerson Parish Hospital did not have the requisite degree of power in the
market for the tying product as it controlled only 30 per cent of the market
for hospital services; thus the arrangement was subject to examination
under a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis.
While the US courts have gradually moved away from a strict per se test,
the US Supreme Court thus far has declined to abandon the per se test alto-
gether in favour of the rule of reason, though it declined to do so by only a
one-vote margin in Jeﬀerson Parish. In Jeﬀerson Parish, Justice O’Connor
was joined by three other justices in a concurring opinion that argued for the
abandonment of the per se approach in favour of the rule of reason, but the
majority decided to remain with the per se rule for reasons of stare decisis:
‘It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of sti-
fling competition and therefore are unreasonable per se.’12 Surely, had Robert
Bork written The Antitrust Paradox after Jeﬀerson Parish was decided, he
would have used this statement as an example of just the sort of majestically-
impervious-to-any-critical-analysis rationale for a per se approach to tying
that he condemned in the passage from his book quoted above.
As stare decisis is an argument of last resort, the per se rule may even-
tually give way to the rule of reason. Faced with lower courts that have
either gone through judicial contortions to stay within a per se rule yet
achieve results more consistent with a rule of reason, or that have aban-
doned the per se approach altogether when faced with a novel tying
arrangement, as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (‘DC Circuit’) did in Microsoft, discussed below, and
with the clear weight of opinion among economists and the academic
community in favour of jettisoning the per se approach in favour of a rule
of reason, it would not be surprising if the US Supreme Court eventually
embraces a rule-of-reason analysis.13
In the meantime, however, the controlling test is a per se test that com-
prises the following four conditions: (1) the tying and the tied products are
two separate products; (2) the seller aﬀords customers no choice but to
purchase the tied product from it; (3) the seller has market power in the
market for the tying product; and (4) the tying arrangement aﬀects a not
insubstantial volume of interstate commerce in the market for the tied
product.14 These conditions will be examined in greater detail below in the
discussion of the features of the optimal test for tying.
(b) A restrictive rule of reason Judicial dissatisfaction with the per se test
is epitomized by the DC Circuit’s ruling in Microsoft where, when faced
with a novel tying claim involving the integration of new features into
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platform software, the court abandoned the per se test in favour of the rule
of reason under which the anticompetitive eﬀects of the tying conduct must
be weighed against the procompetitive justifications.15 The court found that
Microsoft’s tying of the Internet Explorer web browser to its Windows
operating system was capable of generating eﬃciencies for which the per se
test would be unable to account. For example, tying enables independent
software developers to rely on the presence of the web browser’s code in the
Windows operating system platform so that they do not have to go to the
trouble of writing web browser code when writing applications for the plat-
form that would use the web browser. In addition, the court found that the
per se test was ill-suited to account for eﬃciencies generated by new and
innovative product integration because the per se test was backward-
looking in that it focused on historic consumer demand in determining
whether separate demand for the tied product existed. Under the per se test,
the first company to integrate previously distinct products would risk being
condemned because, at the time of integration, there necessarily would be
two distinct product markets. In contrast, a rule-of-reason analysis would
give the first mover an opportunity to prove that the eﬃciency gain from
the tie oﬀset any harm resulting from depriving the consumer of the ability
to buy the products separately.
In the short term at least, the DC Circuit’s opinion is unlikely to have
much formal eﬀect on the assessment of tying claims. The court was careful
to restrict its ruling to tying cases involving platform software. As a pract-
ical matter, this means that its ruling would be unlikely to apply in many
cases as few companies have enough market power in platform software to
be accused of tying.
In the longer term, the DC Circuit’s ruling may well have an influence
on the law on tying that goes beyond its narrow confines, particularly in
cases involving the integration of new features into high-technology prod-
ucts. As one of the key rulings in the Microsoft saga and one that reflects
the prevailing view that the per se test should be abandoned, it has created
additional impetus for change. The court’s opinion may well have an influ-
ence on the development of the law in jurisdictions other than the United
States. Indeed the European Commission went out of its way to empha-
size that the approach adopted in its decision in Microsoft was consistent
with that adopted by the DC Circuit.16 Even if the European Court of
First Instance (‘CFI’) were to follow a diﬀerent route in ruling on
Microsoft’s appeal against the Commission’s decision, it might well take
the DC Circuit’s ruling into account in its deliberations and would likely
give serious consideration to arguments in favour of a rule that takes into
account the eﬀects of tying in the market and the various eﬃciencies that
it can generate.
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EU law
(a) A restrictive per se rule Prior to the European Commission’s decision
in Microsoft, which is discussed in the next section, both the Commission
and the European Courts (the CFI and the European Court of Justice or
‘ECJ’) followed a strict per se approach in evaluating tying practices. To
establish an illegal tie, it suﬃced to show the following: (1) dominance in
the tying product market, (2) the existence of two separate products, and
(3) that the customer was coerced into purchasing the products together. As
in any Article 82 case, the possibility of objective justifications for the prac-
tice was also examined, though these were typically given short shrift.
There was no serious inquiry into factors that would be taken into consid-
eration in the context of a rule-of-reason analysis such as the risk of fore-
closure of competition on the tied product market or possible eﬃciencies
generated by the tying practice.
Compared to the US case law on tying, there is scant EU case law, and
the little case law that exists does not provide much guidance. The two
leading cases, Hilti17 and Tetra Pak,18 both dealt with relatively ‘easy’ tying
cases involving consumables. In Hilti, the Commission found that Hilti
abused its dominant position by selling the customer cartridge strips for its
nail guns only if the customer also bought its nails from Hilti. In Tetra Pak,
the Commission found that Tetra Pak had abused its dominant position by
conditioning the sale of its packaging machines on the customer’s agree-
ment to purchase the cartons used in the machines only from Tetra Pak.
Both of these cases were ‘easy’ in the sense that the tying and tied prod-
ucts were physically separate products that were not only intuitively distinct,
but with respect to which it was easy to show a separate demand in the
market. Thus, in both cases, the European Commission and the European
Courts had no trouble rejecting arguments to the eﬀect that the tying and
tied product formed a single product. In Hilti, evidence that cartridge strips
and nails were manufactured and sold separately by third parties was used
to reject the argument that the nail guns, cartridge strips and nails formed
a single powder-actuated fastening system. In Tetra Pak, the fact that
machines and cartons were sold separately in a closely-related market
involving non-aseptic packaging machines (as opposed to the aseptic pack-
aging machines at issue in the case) was used to reject the argument that
machines and cartons formed an integrated packaging system.
Hilti and Tetra Pak illustrate the per se approach to tying in that there
was little attempt to analyze the eﬀects of the practice on the market or pos-
sible eﬃciencies. Moreover, neither the CFI nor the ECJ articulated a
coherent approach to tying cases that would provide much in the way of
general guidance. The judgments were fact-driven and focused on the dis-
crete issues presented and, because they both involved consumables, they
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do not address the kinds of complex issues presented in cases of techno-
logical tying, which are likely to arise with increasing frequency.
(b) A peculiar rule of reason In its March 2004 decision in Microsoft,19
the European Commission moved away from the strict per se approach of
Hilti and Tetra Pak, towards a test that takes into consideration the eﬀects
of the tying practice in the market for the tied product and allows at least
some consideration of eﬃciencies and procompetitive justifications. The
Commission found that Microsoft’s tying of its Windows Media Player to
its Windows operating system constituted an illegal tie under Article 82.
To reach this conclusion, the Commission applied a five-part test: (1) the
tying and the tied product are two separate products; (2) the seller is dom-
inant in the market for the tying product; (3) the seller does not give cus-
tomers a choice of whether to buy the tying product without the tied
product; (4) tying forecloses competition; and (5) the absence of any objec-
tive justification. While the Commission’s formal statement of its test only
included the first four conditions, the test actually applied by the
Commission included the fifth condition, which is an element to be exam-
ined in any Article 82 case.
In its decision, the Commission had little trouble finding that Microsoft
was dominant in the tying product market of operating systems and that it
had given customers no choice but to take its media player with the opera-
ting system. The bulk of the Commission’s analysis was focused on whether
the Windows operating system and the Windows Media Player were sepa-
rate products, and on whether the alleged tying arrangement foreclosed
competition on the media player market. On the separate products issue,
the Commission found that there was separate demand for Windows Media
Player as a standalone product and, consequently, the two-products
requirement was satisfied. It rejected Microsoft arguments that focused on
the high degree of technological integration involved in adding Windows
Media Player as a feature of Windows and the absence of demand for the
Windows operating system without Windows Media Player.
On the foreclosure issue, the Commission found that, although there was
currently competition in the media player market, the alleged tying
arrangement had the potential to foreclose competition. In reaching this
conclusion, the Commission emphasized the danger that the media player
market might eventually tip towards Microsoft. The Commission also
rejected the justifications put forward by Microsoft for the tie. In evaluat-
ing these justifications, the Commission placed the burden of proof on
Microsoft and held it to a very high standard of proof, requiring it to show
that the tying was indispensable to achieving the alleged eﬃciencies, i.e. that
it was the only way to achieve these eﬃciencies.
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Comparison of the US and EU rule-of-reason tests
In considering what would be the best approach to tying under Article 82,
it is useful to compare the test articulated by the European Commission in
the European version of Microsoft with the rule-of-reason test adopted by
the DC Circuit in the US version of Microsoft. As both cases are recent and
were heavily litigated with extensive economic evidence being presented,
they constitute a fruitful basis for comparison.
At the time that it issued its decision in Microsoft, the European
Commission emphasized that it had used the same approach as the DC
Circuit:
The Commission has followed a ‘rule-of-reason’ approach in order to establish
whether the anticompetitive eﬀects of tying WMP outweigh any possible pro-
competitive benefits. This is precisely the framework for tying cases that the US
Court of Appeals laid down in 2001.20
While the Commission’s decision clearly represents a movement away from the
previousstrictpersetest towardsarule-of-reasonapproach, itdiﬀers in impor-
tant respects from the US rule-of-reason approach adopted by the DC Circuit
in Microsoft. On its face, the test articulated by the Commission in Microsoft
bears greater similarity to the four-part per se test used by most courts in the
United States than it does to the DC Circuit’s rule-of-reason test. On closer
analysis, however, the Commission’s test represents a clear movement towards
a rule of reason. First, the Commission’s test leaves more room for a meaning-
ful examination of the eﬀects of the tying on the market for the tied product.
This is because the examination of eﬀect on trade under the US per se test is
aimed at the jurisdictional requirement that the practice have the requisite
eﬀect on inter-state commerce in the tied product’s market rather than the sub-
stantive question of market foreclosure. In practice, this has proved to be a
fairly low hurdle rather than a rigorous inquiry into whether the anticompeti-
tive harm is substantial enough to be of serious concern.21 Moreover, as noted
above, thetestactuallyappliedbytheCommissioninMicrosoft includedafifth
condition – the consideration of objective justifications and eﬃciencies –
which is more characteristic of a rule-of-reason analysis.
While the consideration of eﬀects and objective justifications brings the
European Commission’s test closer to a US rule-of-reason test, there is a crit-
ical diﬀerence: the Commission placed a much heavier burden of proof on
Microsoft than would have been the case under the US rule-of-reason
approach. The allocation of the burden of proof can have a decisive impact
on the eﬀect of a legal standard. In the Microsoft case, the burden of proof
placed on the defendant was so high that, arguably, it transformed what pur-
ported to be a rule-of-reason standard into a per se test. This issue of the
burden of proof is discussed in greater detail towards the end of this chapter.
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Rethinking tying under Article 82
A doctrine ripe for reform
EU law on tying is in an unsatisfactory state. First, it is unclear what the
prevailing rule is. While the ECJ has applied a strict per se approach in tying
cases, the European Commission has recently followed a much more flexi-
ble test that it has described as a rule-of-reason test. Which test are judges
and advisors to follow? Second, the case law does not articulate a coherent
approach to tying, both because there are so few cases and because the
two leading cases, Hilti and Tetra Pak, dealt with a narrow subset of tying
cases – those where the tied product was a consumable. Third, to the extent
that the current approach fails to take into account the full range of
eﬃciencies associated with tying, either because it does not allow such
eﬃciencies to be pleaded or because the burden of proof is allocated in a
way that negates the ability of a defendant to plead them eﬀectively, it is
inconsistent with the general consensus that the optimal rule would allow
for a robust consideration of eﬃciencies.
Given the shortcomings of the current approach, it would be a welcome
development if the European Commission used the issuance of guidelines
on Article 82 as an opportunity to reform the law on tying. By issuing
guidelines, the Commission has an opportunity to articulate a coherent
approach to tying that is more in line with contemporary economics and to
inject much-needed certainty into the law. In hopes of informing the debate
leading up to the adoption of any such guidelines, this section makes some
recommendations as to the contours of the optimal approach to tying. It
also attempts to identify areas where it might be particularly useful for the
Commission to focus its inquiry.
Per se or rule of reason?
In considering the most appropriate approach to tying under Article 82, the
threshold question is whether a per se or rule-of-reason approach should
be used. The logic behind applying a per se rule to a particular practice is
that, in the majority of cases, the practice is anticompetitive, so that it is not
worth the time or eﬀort to examine individual cases. As Justice O’Connor
noted in her concurring opinion in Jeﬀerson Parish:
In deciding whether an economic restraint should be declared illegal per se, ‘[t]he
probability that the anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and
the severity of those consequences [is] balanced against its procompetitive con-
sequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule
reflects the judgment that such cases are not suﬃciently common or important
to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them’ . . . Only when there
is very little loss to society from banning a restraint altogether is an inquiry into
its costs in the individual case considered to be unnecessary.22
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From this perspective, tying does not lend itself to a per se analysis. As dis-
cussed above, while the debate on the economics of tying continues, econ-
omists seem to be in agreement on one point: tying is not anticompetitive
in the majority of cases. Judges, whether intuitively or using economic
analysis, also seem to have come to this conclusion. The evolution of the
case law in both the United States and the European Union reflects a recog-
nition that tying often entails procompetitive benefits and that the legal rule
must be flexible enough to take these benefits into account. In the United
States, the courts have moved away from a strict per se approach to a more
flexible per se approach that examines rule of reason-like criteria and, in
Microsoft, the DC Circuit went so far as to abandon the per se approach
altogether. Similarly, in the European Union, the Commission’s recent deci-
sion in Microsoft represents a clear departure from the strict per se
approach to tying applied in Hilti and Tetra Pak.
If tying is not generally anticompetitive, common sense suggests that a
per se rule is inappropriate because it results in an overly-broad prohibition
that catches procompetitive practices in order to prohibit those few cases
where tying is anticompetitive. In recent years, the so-called ‘error-cost’
analytical framework has been used to articulate this common-sense propo-
sition in a more scientific, or at least scientific-sounding, way.23 In essence,
this framework looks at the relative costs of mistakes, called ‘false positives’
(false convictions) and ‘false negatives’ (false acquittals). Thus, a per se rule
for price fixing is appropriate because price fixing is almost always harmful,
so it is preferable to condemn those few cases of benign price fixing in order
to prevent the more numerous cases of harmful price fixing from going
unpunished. By the same token, a per se rule for tying would be inappro-
priate because tying is generally procompetitive, so a per se rule would
condemn many cases of procompetitive or benign tying in order to ensure
that the rare case of harmful tying does not slip through the net.
While few would dispute that a strict per se approach is inappropriate for
tying cases, some might contend that the more flexible modified per se
approach currently applied in the United States, and arguably by the
European Commission in its Microsoft decision, is preferable to the rule of
reason because it allows at least partial consideration of eﬀects and
eﬃciencies, yet avoids some of the administrative costs associated with a
full-blown rule-of-reason analysis. In her concurring opinion in Jeﬀerson
Parish, Justice O’Connor found that even such a modified per se approach
was flawed: ‘tying doctrine incurs the costs of the rule-of-reason approach
without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the extensive and time-
consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then
may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis would
show to be beneficial’.24
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Although the modified per se test applied in tying cases may entail many
of the costs associated with the rule of reason, Justice O’Connor’s sugges-
tion that it does not achieve any of the benefits would not seem to be
entirely accurate. To the extent that it allows the courts to consider some of
the possible justifications for the tying, such as the eﬃciencies for which the
two-products test serves as a proxy, the modified per se test achieves at least
some of the benefits of the rule of reason. Even if Justice O’Connor may
have overstated the case, however, it is true that a modified per se test does
not achieve all of the benefits of the rule of reason because there are some
eﬃciencies that are not captured under a per se test, such as those identi-
fied by the DC Circuit in Microsoft. Perhaps even more importantly, a mod-
ified per se test does not allow for an evaluation of the eﬀects of the tying
practice on the market. Moreover, any form of per se test has the drawback
that it entails diﬀerent standards of proof and allocations of burdens of
proof than a rule of reason, which may impede as robust an examination
of eﬃciencies as would be possible under the rule of reason.
If the main diﬀerence between a modified per se test and a rule of reason
is that the former has fewer administrative costs, but does not allow for a
thorough consideration of eﬃciencies, the question then becomes whether
it is worth the extra time and expense to go through a full-blown rule-of-
reason analysis in order to minimize the risk that certain eﬃciencies are
overlooked. One approach to this issue indicated by the DC Circuit in
Microsoft would be to try to identify circumstances in which tying would
be particularly likely to generate eﬃciencies that would not be captured by
a per se test (in that case, tying involving platform software) and apply the
rule of reason in those cases. The drawback to this approach is that it is
diﬃcult to identify in advance all of the possible circumstances in which
tying would be likely to generate procompetitive eﬀects. Another approach
would be to apply the rule of reason in every case on the grounds that the
extra administrative cost is a small price to pay when compared with the
cost of erroneously prohibiting procompetitive tying arrangements.
A compromise that is discussed in the next section would be to use a ‘struc-
tured’ or ‘modified’ rule of reason that would avoid some administrative
costs, yet allow for a thorough consideration of market eﬀects and
eﬃciencies in those cases where such an exercise is most likely to be war-
ranted.
If a rule-of-reason test is appropriate, which one?
If a rule-of-reason test is deemed to be preferable to a per se test, the ques-
tion becomes whether the rule-of-reason test should be a classic rule-of-
reason test or a more structured rule-of-reason test. Under the classic test,
the procompetitive benefits generated by the tying practice are weighed
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against the anticompetitive harms. Under a structured rule of reason, this
balancing of interests only occurs if the practice meets certain screening
conditions.
While a textbook rule of reason has a certain theoretical appeal, it has
serious drawbacks in practice. The kind of economic analysis called for
under a pure rule of reason has been likened to a ‘snipe hunt’ where econ-
omists, lawyers and judges embark on a futile quest for mythical creatures
found only in the universe of economic theory. A prominent US judge,
Frank Easterbrook, warned:
A court could try to conduct a full inquiry into the economic costs and benefits
of a particular business practice . . . [b]ut it is fantastic to suppose that judges
and juries could make such an evaluation. The welfare implications of most
forms of business conduct are beyond our ken. If we assembled twelve econom-
ists and gave them all the available data about a business practice, plus an unlim-
ited computer budget, we would not get agreement about whether the practice
promoted consumers’ welfare or economic eﬃciency more broadly defined. . . .
A global inquiry invites no answer; it puts too many things in issue. To get an
answer to a practical problem, we must start with some assumptions and fixed
points of reference.25
This concern over the ability of economists to arrive at an answer and
of courts to understand that answer in cases that raise complex economic
issues is clearly relevant to the choice of the most appropriate standard
by which to judge tying practices under Article 82. With the decentral-
ization of the power to enforce the EU competition rules that occurred
with the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 in May 2004, litigation
involving Article 82 is likely to arise with increasing frequency at the
national level, often in front of courts with limited experience in dealing
with the kinds of diﬃcult economic issues raised in these cases. The adop-
tion of a rule of reason that calls for weighing complex economic evi-
dence not only could be diﬃcult to apply in practice, but could result in
sharp divergences in the case law at the national level. Apart from the
diﬃculty of applying a rule of reason in the context of complex litigation,
it creates uncertainty for companies and their advisors, who are unlikely
to stop and analyze each tying practice under a full-blown rule-of-reason
analysis.
These same kinds of arguments were raised in the context of the
European Commission’s ‘modernization’ of the EU competition rules
applicable to restrictive agreements pursuant to which it replaced a legalis-
tic, rule-based approach with one grounded in modern economic theory.
While the Commission gave relatively short shrift to these arguments in the
debate surrounding the modernization programme, it alleviated many of
the concerns by creating a series of signposts to guide companies and their
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advisors in the form of market-share screens, safe harbours and lists of pro-
hibited ‘hardcore’ restrictions, all of which were spelled out in detail in a
series of block exemption regulations and guidelines. These signposts
enable companies to do a ‘quick look’ analysis of the relevant practices so
that only those that clearly raise competition concerns are subject to a more
detailed rule of reason-like assessment.
Out of similar concern for greater legal certainty and the need for prac-
tical guidance, it would be useful if any guidelines on Article 82 incorpo-
rated comparable signposts in the form of market share screens,
presumptions and the like. The purpose of these screening conditions
would be to eliminate cases where the risk of anticompetitive harm is
suﬃciently small that it is not worth carrying out a more in-depth inquiry.
The following section considers possible conditions that could be applied
in tying cases.
Possible conditions
What order?
In tying cases, screening conditions are either linked to the very definition
of tying – i.e. the need for two distinct products and the presence of coer-
cion – or they serve to filter out tying cases that do not raise competi-
tion concerns under Article 82 because of lack of a dominant position on
the tying product’s market or foreclosure eﬀects on the tied product’s
market. The screening conditions should not need to be applied in any par-
ticular order. If any one of them is not met, the result should be no abuse
under Article 82. Therefore, a court should be able to address the issue that
seems easiest in a given case. If a case is not screened out, then the inquiry
turns to whether there are objective justifications for the practice or pro-
competitive eﬃciencies that outweigh any anticompetitive harm caused by
the tying practice.
Two products
In determining which tying cases merit a thorough inquiry, perhaps the
most obvious condition that must be met is the existence of two products
because, unless there are separate products, tying is not possible. Over time,
it has become clear that the two-products test also serves as a useful proxy
for many of the eﬃciencies that can be generated by a tying arrangement.
If consumers do not buy the products separately, this suggests that the
benefits of the integrated product such as lower transactional costs or
better technological integration outweigh any negative consequences such
as reduced consumer choice. The two-products test is valuable as a screen
because it is generally easier to determine whether separate products are
involved than it is to prove the existence of the eﬃciencies for which the test
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serves as a proxy. In other words, the two-products inquiry makes it possi-
ble to avoid the often diﬃcult task of proving the underlying eﬃciencies.
The key challenge is formulating a workable two-products test. It is
tempting to approach the separate products issue intuitively, which means
that the inquiry can take on a metaphysical character. Courts using this
I-know-separate-products-when-I-see-them approach may reach the same
result as those using a more analytical approach grounded in economic
analysis, but it is unsatisfactory in terms of achieving predictable and con-
sistent results. In the United States, the courts have moved away from a
largely intuitive approach that focuses on the functional relationship
between the products to a more analytical approach that focuses on the
character of consumer demand for the products. In Jeﬀerson Parish, which
perhaps contains the most extensive discussion of the two-products
requirement, the US Supreme Court made it clear that there must be a sep-
arate consumer demand for the tied product so that it would constitute a
separate product market. In that case, the Court found that hospital ser-
vices and anaesthesiological services were distinct markets because the
available evidence showed that patients and doctors often requested anaes-
thesiological services separately from hospital services.
In the European Union, the development of an analytically-sound two-
products test is not helped by the language of Article 82, which prohibits
‘making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts’. The use of the word ‘nature’ invites courts to focus on the func-
tional relationship between the products rather than on more objective
criteria such as whether competitors oﬀer the products separately.
Fortunately the European Commission and the European Courts have
tended to focus more on the ‘commercial usage’ portion of the test. For
example, in Tetra Pak, the defendant argued that machines and cartons
formed one, integrated product – a packaging system. In finding that
machines and cartons were separate products, the CFI focused on
commercial usage as shown through evidence from the market rather
than embarking on an examination of the functional relationship. More
specifically the CFI found that machines and cartons were oﬀered sepa-
rately on the closely related market for non-aseptic packaging and, thus,
should be considered to be separate products on the market for aseptic
packaging.
If the evidence on commercial usage shows that the products are not
oﬀered separately so that there is only one product, the matter should end
there because tying is only possible if there are two distinct products. While
this point seems fairly obvious, there is language in the ECJ’s judgment in
302 Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic antitrust
Tetra Pak that could be read as suggesting otherwise. More specifically, the
ECJ stated:
It must . . . be stressed that the list of abusive practices set out in the second para-
graph of Article [82] of the Treaty is not exhaustive. Consequently, even where
tied sales of two products are in accordance with commercial usage or there is a
natural link between the two products in question, such sales may still constitute
abuse within the meaning of Article [82] unless they are objectively justified.26
This language harbours potential for confusing the analysis because it
could be read as saying that, even if commercial usage shows that the prod-
ucts are sold together so that there is only one product, a firm may be held
in violation of Article 82. This interpretation would eviscerate the two-
products requirement and, indeed, would not make sense because, by def-
inition, tying requires two products.
The confusion stems from that fact that the ‘commercial usage’ portion
of the Article 82 test may be used in two ways in a tying case: as part of the
separate products test and, in cases where separate products are shown to
exist, as a justification for the tying practice not being abusive. This is pre-
cisely what happened in Tetra Pak. Tetra Pak first pleaded commercial usage
in the aseptic packaging market to show that packaging machines and
cartons were one integrated system. When the CFI rejected this argument
on the grounds that commercial usage in the neighbouring non-aseptic
packaging market showed that machines and cartons were sold separately,
Tetra Pak then pleaded commercial usage as justifying the practice; i.e. that,
since most firms did not sell the products separately, there was no abuse. The
passage from the ECJ’s judgment quoted above was addressing this second
argument. In essence, the ECJ seemed to be saying that, even if a dominant
firm were able to show that most firms did not sell the products separately,
this would not necessarily mean that the tying practice was not abusive.
If the Commission issues guidelines on Article 82, it would be helpful to
clarify that commercial usage is decisive on the separate products issue,
even if it is not on the question of objective justifications for the tying prac-
tice. If commercial usage shows that there is no separate demand for the
products, the matter should end there because tying is only possible if there
are two distinct products. In other words, the passage quoted above should
not be interpreted as suggesting that a firm may be held in violation of
Article 82 even if there is no evidence of separate demand for the products.
Rather the Tetra Pak language should be interpreted as only being relevant
in cases where it has been established that two products exist and the argu-
ment is raised that commercial usage justifies the tying practice. Any other
interpretation would risk undermining an objective, market-based test for
separate products.
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While past commercial usage has the advantage of providing an objec-
tive means of determining whether products are separate that avoids the
vagaries inherent in the more metaphysical inquiry into the nature of the
relationship between the products, it is poorly suited to the situation where
a company combines two products that were previously distinct. Indeed, in
their drive to achieve ever greater technological convergence, companies in
high-tech markets are constantly looking for ways to combine products
that were previously distinct. As the two-products test is inherently back-
ward-looking, it is a poor proxy for eﬃciencies generated by new and inno-
vative integration of previously separate products.
Although such eﬃciencies should be taken into account in order not to
place companies engaged in innovative integration at a disadvantage, the
question is at what stage in the analysis such eﬃciencies should be evalu-
ated. To allow companies to plead eﬃciencies in connection with the two-
products test would seem to undermine the value of this test as a
quick-look screen. It would seem more conducive to a full evaluation of
these eﬃciencies for them to be brought into the analysis at a later stage
when eﬃciencies are pleaded.27
A final issue that the European Commission will need to consider in for-
mulating a workable two-products test is whether the inquiry should be
limited to whether separate consumer demand exists for the tied product or
whether the same question should be asked with respect to the tying
product. In Microsoft, the Commission found that separate products
existed on the basis that there was separate consumer demand for media
players. Microsoft argued, however, that the question should also have been
whether there was a demand for operating systems without the media
player, in other words, for the tying product without the tied product.
Market power
Another obvious condition is market power. If a firm does not have power
in the market for the tying product, it will not be able to force the purchaser
to buy the tied product.
The use of market power as a screen has several practical advantages.
First, it would not require a departure from the EU’s established jurispru-
dence because the threshold issue in any Article 82 case is whether the
defendant has a dominant position. Second, the concept of dominance is
already familiar to courts and competition authorities as well as companies
and their advisors. Third, although the exercise of defining the relevant
market for the purpose of measuring the defendant’s market share can be
very diﬃcult in some cases, in many cases, it is relatively straightforward
and, thus, can provide a ready means of screening out cases where there is
little risk of anticompetitive harm.
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Products are tied together
A third possible condition that, like the two-products test, relates to the
very definition of tying, would require a showing that the two products are
tied together, i.e. that, as a practical matter, the customer does not have a
choice of acquiring the tied product without the tying product. The two
cases in which proof of such a tied sale is easiest are the classic tying case
where the seller makes the sale of the tying product conditional on the pur-
chase of the tied product, and the case of ‘pure’ bundling where the seller
only oﬀers the two products together, so that it is not possible to purchase
either separately.
Matters become much more complicated in the case of ‘mixed’ bundling
where the tying product and the tied product are available separately, but
the seller coerces the customer into buying them together. For example, the
seller may oﬀer a package discount for the two products together that, as a
practical matter, would mean that the purchase of the package is the only
viable economic option. Diﬃcult questions may arise in assessing whether
the seller’s strategy constitutes illegal coercion, such as what price
diﬀerential is enough to support a claim of coercion and to what extent cost
savings may justify charging a lower price for the bundle. In the European
Union, answers to these kinds of questions are even more diﬃcult because
the law on rebate and discount schemes is in a confused state. Clearly the
assessment of such schemes generally and in the specific context of tying
claims is an area where Commission guidelines on Article 82 could inject
much-needed clarity into the law.
Another form of tying that is likely to arise with increasing frequency in
this age of technological convergence is so-called ‘technological’ tying
where there is a technical link between the tying product and the tied
product so that the tying product is designed to only work with the tied
product or is designed to work better with the tied product. As discussed
below in connection with eﬃciencies, technological tying that involves the
integration of new features into high-technology products is likely to gen-
erate procompetitive eﬃciencies and should be judged under a deferential
standard that takes full account of these eﬃciencies.
Many cases involving technological tying may well morph into diﬃcult
compulsory licensing cases because the only eﬀective remedy for the alleged
tie is likely to be for the dominant firm to make its interface information
available to competitors so that they can make compatible products. If the
interface information is already available, the alleged tie is unlikely to be
eﬀective because competitors would be free to make compatible products
and there would be no appreciable foreclosure on the market for the tied
product. Of course, there is the murky middle ground where some interface
information has been made available, but competitors claim that they need
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more information to ensure that their products are not placed at a disad-
vantage. The EU Microsoft case involves just this issue: competitors on the
workgroup server market claimed that they needed additional interface
operation to allow their servers to work as well with the Microsoft operat-
ing system as Microsoft’s own servers.
The compulsory disclosure of interface information raises a host of
issues beyond the scope of this chapter and which are the subject of a
heated debate in the context of the Microsoft appeal. For the purposes of
this chapter, the key point is that, even though issues involving the disclo-
sure of interface information may initially arise in the context of a tying
allegation, the analytical framework developed for tying cases is ill-suited
to deal with them; instead, they are more appropriately resolved on the
basis of principles developed in the context of compulsory licensing cases.
Foreclosure
A fourth possible condition is that the tying practice must be shown to fore-
close competition on the market for the tied product. It is the inclusion
of this condition that transforms what would otherwise be some form of a
per se test into a rule-of-reason test because it calls for an analysis of the
economic eﬀects of the tying practice on the tied market.
In establishing whether this condition is met, the key questions are how
much foreclosure must be shown before the tying is considered significant
enough to give rise to a competition concern and, relatedly, to what extent
potential foreclosure must be taken into account. The answer to the first
question of how much necessarily entails a degree of arbitrariness and is
linked to the second question in the sense that, even if the degree of actual
foreclosure is limited, if potential foreclosure is taken into account, this will
aﬀect the answer. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the European
Commission could provide some concrete guidance. At the very least, it
would be helpful if there were a minimum safe harbour below which com-
panies could be confident that foreclosure would not be considered to have
a significant eﬀect on competition.
While limiting the foreclosure inquiry to actual foreclosure would seem
to be an unduly narrow approach, as plaintiﬀs should not have to wait until
there is no more competition on the market before they can bring a suc-
cessful tying claim, the diﬃculty is developing a workable test for potential
foreclosure. Microsoft highlights the challenges in this regard as one of the
most hotly-debated issues in that case concerned the Commission’s analy-
sis of potential foreclosure on the tied product’s market. In its decision, the
Commission found that Microsoft’s tying of its Window Media Player to
its operating system created an unacceptable risk of potential foreclosure
of competition in the media player market. To reach this conclusion, the
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Commission had to make a number of assumptions about the future and
rely on a somewhat speculative chain of causation. It reasoned that,
because Microsoft’s operating system was ubiquitous, this gave Microsoft
an advantage in promoting its media player, which would cause content
providers to write programs only for Microsoft’s Windows Media Player,
which would cause the media player market to tip in Microsoft’s favour.
Although a discussion of the merits of the Commission’s approach in
Microsoft is beyond the scope of this chapter, the case highlights the desir-
ability of placing appropriate limits on what constitutes potential foreclo-
sure because, otherwise, there is a danger that the inquiry will become too
speculative and virtually impossible to apply in practice. In particular, it
would be helpful if the Commission were able to provide guidance on the
time period over which potential foreclosure should be measured as well as
the applicable standard of proof, which is discussed below.
Objective justifications and eﬃciencies
If the conditions for tying are met, the defendant may then put forward
objective justifications for its practice or show that the practice generates
procompetitive eﬃciencies that outweigh any anticompetitive harm. Thus
far, defendants in EU tying cases have not been very successful in pleading
objective justifications and eﬃciencies.
The most oft-cited example of an objective justification is where tying
is necessary for reasons of health or safety. For example, in Hilti, the
defendant argued that the tying of cartridges and nails was justified on
the grounds that it was necessary to ensure that nails of the requisite
quality were used with its nail guns and it even produced expert studies
showing that competitors’ nails were of inferior quality. The CFI rejected
this line of argument on the grounds that Hilti should have complained
to the appropriate authorities rather than taking the matter into its own
hands. Similarly, in Tetra Pak, the CFI rejected the defendant’s argument
that the tying of machines and cartons was necessary on grounds of
public health. According to the CFI, if Tetra Pak was worried about the
suitability of competitors’ cartons for its machines, it should have dis-
closed the technical specifications that cartons needed to meet to be used
on its machines.
These cases suggest that defendants will rarely be successful with health
and safety arguments. It almost seems that the defendant would have to
show that a consumer had been injured by a competitor’s inferior product
after the defendant had complained to the appropriate public authority. In
the context of its current review of Article 82, the Commission might well
consider whether placing such a heavy burden on defendants to prove that
tying lowers health and safety risks is consistent with a general analytical
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framework that recognizes that tying is not anticompetitive in most cases
and, perhaps more importantly, whether this approach is in the best inter-
est of consumers given the consequences if it has the eﬀect of chilling
eﬀorts by manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible.
Eﬃciency arguments have not fared much better than health and safety
arguments. In Microsoft, Microsoft argued that the integration of the
Windows Media Player into the Windows operating system generated a
number of procompetitive eﬃciencies such as lower transaction costs
because consumers would not have to purchase the products separately.
It also emphasized that tying produced benefits because software develop-
ers would not have to worry about writing code for the media player func-
tionality, but could concentrate on developing new applications. The
Commission rejected all of these arguments with little diﬃculty.
As discussed in the next section, at least part of the reason that defend-
ants have met with so little success in justifying their tying practices is that
the standard of proof and the allocation of the burden of proof work
against them. As suggested below, procedural rules that place defendants
at a disadvantage would seem to be at odds with the view that tying is gen-
erally benign. On the substantive side, the Commission may want to con-
sider whether a more deferential standard for the assessment of objective
justifications and eﬃciencies would not be more in keeping with an analy-
sis of tying under a rule-of-reason framework.
In this regard, the kinds of eﬃciencies pleaded by Microsoft in the
context of technological integration are at the heart of the current push
towards technological convergence in the information technology and con-
sumer electronics industries and would seem to merit more weight than
they were given in the Commission’s decision. These eﬃciencies should be
judged under a deferential standard unless courts and competition author-
ities are prepared to start second-guessing manufacturers on product
design and integration issues. In the United States, the courts have clearly
applied a more deferential standard in cases involving technological tying
for precisely this reason.28
In judging eﬃciencies in cases involving the integration of new features
into products, the ‘commercial usage’ criterion of Article 82 may prove
useful. As discussed above, this criterion may come into play both in
determining whether there are distinct products and in evaluating possi-
ble justifications. Even if commercial usage shows that some firms oﬀer
the tied product separately so that there are separate products, if the
integration of the tying and tied product is common practice in the indus-
try, this constitutes strong evidence that the integration creates eﬃciencies
because non-dominant firms would not have an incentive to do so
otherwise.
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Standard and burden of proof
Importance of appropriate procedural rules
In developing the optimal approach to tying under Article 82, one area of
focus should be the correct allocation of the burden of proof and the
appropriate standards of proof, both of which will play key roles in deter-
mining the actual impact of whatever substantive legal test is chosen.
Unless suﬃcient attention is given to these procedural issues, any reform of
the substantive approach to tying risks having only a limited eﬀect in prac-
tice. The EU Microsoft case illustrates this risk: the European Commission
announced that its decision heralded a movement away from a per se test
to a rule of reason, yet the rules that it applied on the standard of proof
and the burden of proof were weighted so heavily in its favour that its new
rule-of-reason approach was arguably nothing but a per se approach by
another name.
The procedural rules on the allocation of the burden of proof and the
standard of proof should be tailored to the substantive approach to the
practice at issue, which means that these rules may not necessarily be
the same in all Article 82 cases. Thus, if tying is considered to be benign in
most cases so that it is judged under a rule of reason, these procedural rules
should reflect this presumption. As discussed below, the procedural rules
currently applied in tying cases reflect the per se approach to tying in that
they favour the Commission and need to be reshaped to better reflect the
assumptions underlying a rule-of-reason approach.
Burden of proof
In considering the most appropriate rules on the burden of proof in an
Article 82 tying case, the basic steps in a rule-of-reason analysis under US
law provide a useful point of comparison. In Microsoft, the DC Circuit set
forth the basic steps in a rule-of-reason analysis in the portion of its opinion
dealing with the Section 2 monopolization claim against Microsoft, and
noted that the steps under a Section 1 rule-of-reason analysis were similar.29
The steps in the rule-of-reason balancing process are as follows:
1. the plaintiﬀ must show that the seller’s conduct had an anticompetitive
eﬀect;
2. if the plaintiﬀ establishes a prima facie case, the seller must oﬀer pro-
competitive justifications for his conduct;
3. if the seller establishes procompetitive justifications, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiﬀ to rebut the claim; and
4. if the plaintiﬀ is unable to rebut the asserted justifications, it must
show that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the
procompetitive benefit.
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In the European Union, the plaintiﬀ also has the burden of establishing the
infringement. Article 2 of Regulation 1/200330 provides as follows:
In any national or Community proceeding for the application of Articles 81 and
82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of
Article 82 of the Treaty shall rest on the party or authority alleging the infringe-
ment. The undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions
of that paragraph are fulfilled.
Regulation 1/2003 is unclear on the allocation of the burden of proof in
establishing justifications and eﬃciencies in an Article 82 case. Although
Article 2 explicitly places the burden of establishing procompetitive eﬀects
on the defendant in an Article 81 case, it does not specify who has the
burden of proving justifications for the allegedly abusive conduct in an
Article 82 case. The broad language of Recital 5 of Regulation 1/2003 sug-
gests that this burden falls on the defendant in Article 82 as well as Article
81 cases: ‘[i]t should be for the undertaking or association of undertakings
invoking the benefit of a defence against a finding of infringement to
demonstrate to the required legal standard that the conditions for applying
such defence are satisfied’. However Article 2’s silence on the issue of who
bears the burden of proof on eﬃciencies and objective justifications in an
Article 82 case would seem to leave the Commission with some discretion
in allocating the burden of proof on these issues.
So far the Commission has placed the burden of establishing objective
justifications and eﬃciencies entirely on the defendant. In its Microsoft
decision, the Commission made it clear that Microsoft bore the burden of
proof on these points and that it had not discharged that burden, stating
that ‘Microsoft has not submitted adequate evidence to the eﬀect that tying
WMP is objectively justified by procompetitive eﬀects which would out-
weigh the distortion of competition caused by it’.31
Thus, while the United States and European Union both place the
initial burden on the plaintiﬀ to establish the infringement in a rule-
of-reason case, the two jurisdictions then appear to diverge, particularly
on the question of who has the final burden of proving objective justifi-
cations and eﬃciencies. Under the US rule-of-reason test described above,
once the defendant puts forward a plausible argument on objective justi-
fications and eﬃciencies, the burden shifts back to the plaintiﬀ to show
either that these justifications are merely pretextual or that they are
outweighed by the anticompetitive eﬀects of the tying arrangement. In
contrast, the EU’s approach requires the defendant not only to estab-
lish the existence of eﬃciencies, but to show that they outweigh any
anticompetitive harm.
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Placing the burden on the defendant, at least in the first instance, to put
forward objective justifications and eﬃciencies in an Article 82 case makes
sense. Once the Commission has established a prima facie case under
Article 82, the defendant should have the burden of explaining why its
conduct is not abusive. Moreover the defendant will be in the best position
to identify specific eﬃciencies generated by the tie and to produce evidence
of those eﬃciencies.
Once the defendant has put forward credible evidence on eﬃciencies and
objective justifications, however, it is questionable whether the defendant
should bear the ultimate burden of proof of establishing that the
eﬃciencies put forward outweigh any anticompetitive eﬀects. First, who
bears the burden of proof could be decisive in some cases because of the
diﬃculty of proving eﬃciencies. If the basic premise is that tying is benign
in the majority of cases, the burden of proof should be allocated in a way
that gives the defendant the benefit of the doubt in close cases. This propo-
sition would seem to be all the more true in cases involving technological
tying because, as discussed above, there is a higher likelihood that these
cases involve eﬃciencies and should be reviewed under a deferential stan-
dard. Second, the Commission is in a much better position than the defend-
ant to weigh the evidence on procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive
harms in these cases because it has access to much more evidence.
Standards of proof
On the question of the relevant standards of proof in tying cases, the
European Commission’s current approach also appears to favour the
plaintiﬀ which, again, seems to be inconsistent with the basic premise that,
if anything, the procedural rules should favour the defendant in tying cases.
As discussed, in establishing the existence of an infringement in its decision
in Microsoft, the Commission relied on a chain of causation that, at the
very least, was questionable in showing that there was a risk of foreclosure
on the tied product market. At least to the extent that the issue concerns
predicting the future eﬀects of a tying practice such as potential market
foreclosure, it is arguable that the Commission failed to meet the standard
of proof required by the ECJ’s recent judgment in the Tetra Laval.32 In that
case, which dealt with the standard of proof to be met by the Commission
in merger cases, the ECJ emphasized that it was important for the
Commission to put forward convincing evidence in merger cases because
the Commission is trying to predict the situation on the relevant market
after the merger. On this point, the ECJ stated:
[a] prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger control must be
carried out with great care since it does not entail the examination of past
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events – for which often many items of evidence are available which make it
possible to understand the causes – or of current events, but rather a predic-
tion of events which are more or less likely to occur in future if a decision pro-
hibiting the planned concentration or laying down the conditions for it is not
adopted.33
The ECJ then explained that it was ‘particularly important’ for the
Commission to put forward convincing evidence in cases involving con-
glomerate mergers, i.e. where the parties are on neighbouring markets
and there is a concern that they will be able to leverage their power
in one market to increase their power in another:
The analysis of a ‘conglomerate-type’ concentration is a prospective analysis
in which, first, the consideration of a lengthy period of time in the future and,
secondly, the leveraging necessary to give rise to a significant impediment to
eﬀective competition mean that the chains of causation and eﬀect are dimly
discernible, uncertain and diﬃcult to establish. That being so, the quality of
evidence produced by the Commission in order to establish that it is necessary
to adopt a decision declaring the concentration incompatible with the common
market is particularly important, since that evidence must support the
Commission’s conclusion that, if such a decision were not adopted, the eco-
nomic development envisaged by it would be plausible.34
While Tetra Laval only dealt with the standard of proof in merger
cases, the ECJ’s reasoning would seem applicable to any competition case
in which the Commission is required to evaluate future economic eﬀects.
The ECJ’s reasoning would seem particularly relevant to the determina-
tion of the standard of proof that the Commission must meet in estab-
lishing the requisite degree of foreclosure on the tied product’s market in
a tying case. Establishing foreclosure not only requires the Commission
to predict what will happen in the future if the tying practice continues,
but requires it to establish that the dominant firm has the ability to lever-
age its dominant position on the tying product’s market to foreclose com-
petition on the tied product’s market. Thus, the Commission must
address chains of causation that are very similar to those involved in a
conglomerate merger case, which, in the words of the ECJ, are ‘dimly dis-
cernable, uncertain and diﬃcult to establish’.35 Indeed, it could be argued
that the standard of proof should be even higher in the context of an
Article 82 case because of the almost penal character of the high fines
that can be imposed.
The issue of the appropriate standard of proof also arises in connection
with the standard that the defendant must meet in establishing the existence
of eﬃciencies and objective justifications. In Microsoft, the Commission
required Microsoft to meet a very high standard of proof. With regard to
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the eﬃciencies flowing to independent software developers of having the
Windows Media Player integrated into the Windows operating system, the
Commission found that ‘Microsoft has failed to supply evidence that tying
of WMP is indispensable for the alleged pro-competitive eﬀects to come
into eﬀect’.36 Requiring the defendant not only to establish that the tying
practice gives rise to procompetitive justifications, but to show also that it
is indispensable for these procompetitive justifications to arise makes it vir-
tually impossible for the defendant ever to win on the issue of eﬃciencies.
Indeed, it is diﬃcult to reconcile requiring the defendant to meet such a
high standard of proof with any approach that purports to be a rule-of-
reason approach.
The procedural rules on the allocation of the burden of proof and the
standard of proof are notoriously vague. For example, until Tetra Laval,
the European Courts typically would state that, in merger cases, the
Commission was required to produce enough evidence so as to meet the
‘requisite legal standard’ without specifying what that standard was.37 In
the wake of Tetra Laval, the EU antitrust community has begun to pay
more attention to the applicable procedural rules.38 While the focus has
largely been on merger cases, procedural issues merit attention in the
context of Article 81 and 82 cases as well. It is to be hoped that the
Commission will include procedural issues within the scope of its Article
82 review because, otherwise, any reform of the substantive rules may only
have limited eﬀect in practice.
Conclusion
Of the abusive practices under Article 82, tying is the poster child for the
need for an approach freed from the straitjacket of a rigid legalistic
approach and more in line with contemporary economic theory. While
economists continue to debate various aspects of tying, a consensus
seems to have emerged that, in most cases, tying is benign and should be
judged under a rule-of-reason standard rather than a per se standard.
Unfortunately, the prevailing substantive test for tying in the European
Union is a strict per se rule that does not take into account either the
eﬀects of the tying practice on the market or all the eﬃciencies that it can
generate. While the European Commission’s recent decision in Microsoft
suggests that the law may be moving towards a rule-of-reason approach,
the procedural rules governing the allocation of the burden of proof and
the standard of proof place defendants at such a disadvantage that, for
all practical purposes, they may as well be operating under a per se
approach.
In the context of its current review of its policy under Article 82, the
question facing the European Commission is not so much whether to adopt
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a rule-of-reason approach to tying cases. It has already shown a willingness
to do so in Microsoft and, more generally, a rule-of-reason approach would
be consistent with its general aim of having an eﬀects-based policy. Rather
the question is, what are the optimal contours of this rule of reason? As dis-
cussed in this chapter, a structured rule of reason that includes a number of
screening conditions along the lines outlined by the Commission in
Microsoft would seem to be the best approach. It minimizes the need for
the kind of open-ended inquiry called for under the classic rule of reason,
where procompetitive eﬀects are weighed against anticompetitive harm. At
the same time, it allows such an inquiry in appropriate cases. Most import-
antly, it provides more concrete, practical guidance to companies and their
advisors, as well as to competition authorities and courts, than a pure rule-
of-reason approach.
The issuance of guidelines on Article 82 would allow the Commission to
flesh out the screening conditions to provide as much concrete guidance as
possible, in much the way it has done in the context of developing the rules
and guidelines for the various categories of restrictive agreements. There
are a number of questions of degree where it would be helpful to have some
concrete indication of where the cut-oﬀ point is likely to be. How much
foreclosure on the tied product’s market is required to give rise to competi-
tion concerns? What is the relevant time period for an inquiry into poten-
tial foreclosure? How much demand must there be for the products
separately for them to be considered as separate products for tying pur-
poses? While any attempt to address these kinds of questions in the abstract
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, it may be worth sacrificing some theo-
retical purity for greater certainty.
In parallel with its review of the substantive rules on tying, the
Commission needs to re-evaluate the procedural rules. Instead of reflecting
the underlying presumption that, in most cases, tying is benign, the current
rules do just the opposite. While the Commission has some constraints on
what it can do in the procedural area as it must adhere to the rules set forth
in Regulation 1/2003 as well as in the case law, there is still scope for recal-
ibrating the procedural rules so that they reflect the more deferential stan-
dard that tying cases deserve.
Finally the review of its policy under Article 82 oﬀers the Commission
the opportunity to move ahead of the United States in bringing the law on
tying into line with contemporary economic theory. If it does so, it may also
help create more favourable conditions in Europe for the increased inte-
gration of new features into information technology and consumer elec-
tronics products and broader convergence among these sectors, which is
one of the key drivers for the success of high-tech companies.
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